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Commentary
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William C. Levin

cultural commentary william c. Levin

Supporters of Barack Obama’s run for the Presidency of
the United States seem to have set new records for
anxiety in the last days before the election. In our
house, it was a twenty-Tums week. Despite poll results
that consistently predicted Obama would win the
popular vote by three to five percentage points, and the
Electoral College race by a large margin, fans of his
candidacy seemed certain that something awful would
happen. He was bound to lose. For a long while the
likely scenario for the fall was of the revelation of an
Obama skeleton so grotesque as to sink his chances
entirely. Forget about those silly little dirt bombs like
the rumors that he was a Muslim, Arab, a friend to
radicals of various sorts, or that he was hard-heartedly
unconcerned about the fate of his poor Auntie Welfare.
No, this was to be a really nasty one that would blow
the whole thing apart. Bigamy, perhaps, with pictures
for proof? None of these fears proved real, of course.
By far the most common source of anxiety for the
nail-biters was the certainty that the polls were wrong.
Apparently, the fear was that a percentage of white
respondents to pollsters were saying publicly that they
were either undecided or were planning on voting for
Obama, but once in the voting booth they would vote
for McCain. The polling experts told us that this had
happened before, and has come to be termed the
“Bradley effect.”“ In 1982 Tom Bradley, the AfricanAmerican, Democratic Mayor of Los Angeles, lost his
race for the Governorship of California to George
Deukmejian, a white Republican. Polls predicted that
Bradley would win comfortably, but he narrowly lost.
It was suggested in some post-election studies that
white voters had voted for Bradley at a lower rate than
they had indicated in polls, and that a statistically
unlikely percent of those who had said they were
undecided, ultimately voted for Deukmejian.
Feeding the fears of a Bradley effect in the ObamaMcCain race was the list of other contests between
black and white candidates in which vote tallies were
consistently lower for black candidates than polls had
predicted. Among the black candidates who appear to
have experienced this phenomenon were Harold
Washington in his 1983 bid to be Mayor of Chicago,
Jesse Jackson in the 1988 Democratic presidential

primary, David Dinkins’ race for Mayor of New York in
1989, Douglas Wilder in the 1989 race for Governor of
Virginia, and Carol Mosely Braun in her 1992 Senate
race in Illinois.
When Obama won the election, it seemed that the fears
of his supporters had been unfounded. Polls just before
the election had predicted that he would win by 7.5% in
the national popular vote. He won by about 1% less
than that, well within the small (2%) margin of error
that even polls using massive samples must accept.
Perhaps white Americans who told pollsters that they
planned to vote for Obama actually did.
But why should Obama supporters waste a perfectly
good fear of disaster on rational interpretations of the
outcome? A closer, and more tortured, view of vote
patterns allows us to have our victory and fear it too.
Perhaps there was a real Bradley effect, but Obama
won anyway.
We sociologists are all too familiar with the forces that
underlie the Bradley effect. It’s called “social desirability
effect,” the tendency of a survey respondent to tell the
interviewer what he or she thinks is socially acceptable
rather than the truth. We have lots of evidence that this
happens in all sorts of surveys, including political polls.
For example, Americans routinely exaggerate how often
they attend church and minimize how much alcohol
they drink in order to reflect what they think are
American standards of behavior. In studies of racial
attitudes, some of our best data about social desirability
effect goes back at least eighty years.
Beginning in 1926, the sociologist Emory Bogardus
started collecting survey data on racial attitudes in
America. He devised a measure of prejudice in which he
asked a sample of white college students to indicate
how “socially close” they would allow members of
specific groups. For example, asking a respondent to
think of black Americans in general, would the
respondent allow such a person to marry into his or
her family? If not, then would close friendship be ok?
No? How about letting a black American live in the
neighborhood with you? The actual social distance
scale items looked like the following.
As close relatives by marriage
As my close personal friends
As neighbors on the same street
As co-workers in the same occupation
As citizens in my country
As only visitors in my country
Would exclude from my country
In 1926 Bogardus, using thirty target groups for his
study, found clear patterns of prejudice in his sample of
white college students. They would allow very close
social distance to white, western European “targets”

such as white, English people. However, as the named
groups of people moved farther east and south of
England, and as their skin colors got darker and their
cultures less “Western”, their social distance scores
declined. Mediterranean groups were less acceptable
than western Europeans, and African and Asian groups
least acceptable of all. Bogardus repeated his studies in
1946, 1956 and 1966 using the same sorts of college
student samples. Though he found that levels of
prejudice declined over time, the same overall pattern
of group preferences remained. These patterns were
extremely stable, withstanding even cataclysmic events
such as World War II. For example, the standing of
Germans took a hit in the 1946 data. Germans had
dropped four places, from their standing at seventh of
thirty groups in 1926, to tenth place. But only ten years
later, the 1956 data had them back in eighth position on
the list. I believe it is a measure of the extreme stability
of these social distance rankings that fighting a
desperate war against Germany only diminished their
relative standing by a few places in the estimation of
the white Americans in Bogardus’ study.
Scientists value highly such data that tracks important
phenomena over time. It is rare that we have the
resources and foresight to collect it consistently. So
it seemed strange to me that after 1966 no one collected
social distance data using Bogardus’ scale. (Bogardus
died in 1973, but he had lots of graduate students and
colleagues who could have continued the research.)
The reason, it is clear, was the rise of social desirability
effect.
After World War II a number of intense cultural and
political movements combined to influence what was
socially acceptable for Americans to say and do. For
example, stating that women should stay at home, or
that black Americans were best suited to physical labor,
would have raised few eyebrows before the 1960’s. But
after the widespread successes of the movements for
racial civil rights and sexual equality in America, such
comments became increasingly unacceptable here. The
effect was clear in the attempt to measure prejudice
with Bogardus’ scale. Respondents were no longer
willing to state that one group was preferable to
another, even if they privately held such beliefs.
This brings us back to the Bradley effect. Pollsters were
well aware that Americans who would not vote for a
black candidate would likely not admit it. In order to
appear to be without racial prejudice, they would lie
about their intentions. So when Obama won the
election by about the percentage that the polls had
predicted, those of us who had been tracking the life of
social desirability effect in America thought it might
have finally expired. I say, not so much.

Presidential Election 2008
Obama/Biden Campaign
Polling Response Form
Instructions for field interviewers: After reading the
following question to a respondent, check one of the spaces
that follow.
“If the election for President of the United States were being
held today, for which of the following candidates would
you be most likely to vote?”
__ Respondent will vote for McCain/Palin
__ Respondent will vote for Obama/Biden
__ Respondent says he/she will vote for Obama/
Biden, but is wearing a McCain/Palin button
__ Respondent says he/she will vote for Obama/
Biden, but has his or her fingers crossed
__ Respondent says he/she will vote for Obama/
Biden, but is smirking
__ Respondent says he/she will vote for Obama/
Biden, but is rolling on the floor helpless with mirth

It is entirely possible that this election had the usual
proportion of people who told pollsters that they were
undecided or intending to vote for Obama, then voted
against him. It’s just that this fact was masked by a
number of other, unprecedented voting patterns.
Among these were the following sorts of voters. There
were, apparently, many who voted for Obama because
he was black. They told pollsters that they could help
make history for America by putting a minority
candidate into office. Increased participation among
black and Latino voters who voted disproportionately
for Obama influenced the outcome. And there were
young voters, who also voted disproportionately for
Obama. In fact, young voters were underrepresented in
pre-election polling because polling organizations had
poor access to cell phone numbers in their random-digit
dialing sampling procedures.
So, from this sociologist’s point of view, the Bradley
effect is probably alive and well in America. There has
been too long a history of documented social desirability effect in other research to conclude that the election
of a black American to the presidency is evidence of its
demise. And, lest you think that I am sorry to come to
this conclusion, I want to make it clear that I think the
unwillingness of Americans to publicly express their
prejudices is a very good thing. To me it is a measure of
our national disapproval of group hatreds. How can
that be anything but a source of pride in our culture?
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